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FEDERAL GASES
faith and credit" clause of the constitution. Pointing out that the
Supreme Court in the Rickards case3" had approved Kilberg, the court
said,
We do hold, however, that a state with substantial ties to a transaction
in dispute has a legitimate constitutional interest in the application of
its own rules of law. If, indeed, those connections are wholly lacking
or at best tenuous, then it may be proper to conclude that the state has
exceeded its constitutional power in applying its local law.33
The earlier Pearson decision is thus removed as an impediment to
the development of new choice-of-law rules. The later Pearson deci-
sion, in conjunction with the dicta in Richards, appears to clear the
way for state courts to take a new approach in the conflict of law
area, giving such force as may seem reasonable to public policy of the
forum jurisdiction.
DAVID W. SANDELL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Federal Recess Appointments. Allocco, who had been convicted
of a narcotics violation by a jury,1 petitioned a United States District
Court to grant his motion for release under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging
that his conviction should be set aside because the judge who sat at his
trial was not properly appointed to his office so as to be able to exercise
the judicial power conferred by U.S. CONST. art. III. The district
court denied his motion and the court of appeals affirmed.' This was
the first federal decision in recent times to deal directly with the recess
appointment power and the first ever to approve the long-established
practice of making recess appointments to the federal bench without
regard to when the vacancy first occurred.
The judge who presided at petitioner's trial had been appointed by
the President to fill a vacancy that had first occurred while the Senate
was in session.' On the appeal of the denial of his motion, the petitioner
attacked the mode of appointment on two main grounds. Preliminarily,
he argued that it is not constitutional to appoint a judge to a court
32 369 U.S. at 12, n26.
33 U.S.L. WaaK at 2257. The court is apparently leaving open the question of what
constitutes "substantial contacts."
IUnited States v. Allocco, 234 F2d 955 (2d cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 931
(1957).
2United States v. Allocco, 200 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd. 305 F.2d 704
(2d cir. 1962).
3 "First occurred," when used in this note to describe when a vacancy occurred,
means the point of time at which the position ceased to be filled.
1963]
IASHINGTON LAW REVIE[
created under U.S. CONST. art. III when that judge does not have life
tenure.4 The Constitution apparently gives the President the power
to make temporary appointments to offices that normally can only be
filled with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Constitution
allows the President to exercise this temporary appointment power
when the Senate is in recess.5 A judge appointed under this provision
has only limited tenure since his commission expires at the end of the
next Senate session.6 For the appointment to become permanent, the
President must submit the nomination to the Senate for approval. If
the nomination is confirmed by the Senate, the President may issue a
permanent commission to his nominee thereby giving the judge life
tenure. The petitioner argued that since article III provides that the
judges sitting on the courts created thereunder are to have life tenure,
a judge without such tenure therefore lacks constitutional authority to
exercise the judicial powers conferred by article III.
It cannot be said that the court of appeals made any real effort to
meet the reasoning of the petitioner's first argument. Recognizing that
article III provides safeguards for the judiciary designed to insulate
and protect that body from its more potent brothers, the Congress and
the Executive, the court, nevertheless, preferred to designate as hypo-
thetical the risks that may ensue from allowing judges with temporary
tenure to sit on article III courts. Policy considerations, to be
examined, appear to have motivated the court's decision.
Insofar as the questions raised by the petitioner's first argument have
been dealt with extensively by other writers,8 this note will be con-
cerned with petitioner's main argument, namely, that even if the recess
appointive power is valid it is not so broad as to authorize the procedure
followed in the instant case.'
The recess appointee was selected to fill a vacancy that had occurred
while the Senate was still in session. The actual granting of the tem-
4 United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708 (2d cir. 1962). The court notes that
the district courts are created under U.S. CONST. art. III, and that judges of those
courts, by virtue of that article, have life tenure. "The judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good Behaviour. U.S. CoNsT.
art. III, §1.
5 "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during
the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of
their next Session." U.S. CONST. art II, §2, cl. 3.
6 Ibid.
'United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709 (2d cir. 1962).
8 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESs., RECESS AP-
POINTMENTS OF FEDERAL JUDGES (Comm. Print 1959) ; S. REP. No. 80, 37TH CONG.,
3D SESS. (1863) ; Note, 10 STAN. L. REV. 124 (1957) ; Note, Recess Appohttments to
the Supreme Court, 17 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 157 (1962).
9 United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1962).
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porary commission took place after the Senate had adjourned. The
petitioner contends that the clause granting the recess power, by its
terms, applies only to those vacancies that first occur while the Senate
is not in session. The argument is based on the theory that the recess
power was created and designed as an auxiliary method of appointment
to be used when the Senate is not available, and was not intended to
supplant the ordinary mode of appointment provided in the Constitu-
tion."
The court seemed to imply that the clause granting the recess power
would, on a literal reading, tend to support the petitioner's argument.1
The word "happen" as used in the clause would naturally tend to mean
goccur," as the petitioner suggests, rather than "happen to exist" as the'
government insists. However, the court went on to say that an accept-
ance of the petitioner's interpretation of the word "happen" would
restrict the power granted by the clause. In refusing to impose this
restriction, 2 the court quoted Mr. Justice Brandeis: "The logic of
words should yield to the logic of realities."' 8
In the court's view, the entire recess appointment power is a means
by which the orderly functioning of the government can be maintained;
through the use of the power important government posts may be kept
filled . 4 It must be remembered that the recess power applies not only
to judges but also to cabinet members, ambassadors, and other high
officials." The court was not willing to strike down a provision under
which vacancies in many important positions have been filled, even
though the vacancy may have first occurred during the Senate's session.
The court elaborately explained the process that is followed when a
nominee is selected to fill a judicial vacancy."6 For example, an un-
expected vacancy caused by an untimely death occurring near the end
of the Senate's session could not be filled under the current procedure
before the Senate adjourned. The careful probing of the prospective
nominee's background, qualifications, and probable acceptability would
require too much time. Furthermore, as the court noted, requiring
that such a vacancy be filled before the recess might unduly rush the
10 U.S. CoNsT. art II, § 2, cl. 2, quoted at note 5 supra.
21 United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1962).
12 Ibid.
' Ibid., quoting Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927).
14 Id. at 712.
15 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 follows immediately after the general provision for
appointments and is usually considered to apply to all the offices named therein. See
text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
26 United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 710 (2d cir. 1962).
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Senate's consideration of the nominee." Holding the recess appointive
power to be unconstitutional when applied to vacancies that first
occurred during the Senate's session would mean either unduly acceler-
ating the appointment process or leaving the post unfilled until the
Senate reconvened. The court was unwilling to create a need for such
alternatives.
The court's decision does, it is true, approve a mechanism whereby
important government positions may be kept filled. At the same time,
however, it sanctions a method by which the President could avoid
the normal procedure for making appointments. The President can
issue a recess commission to fill a vacancy first occurring during the
Senate's session. This commission does not expire until the end of the
next Senate session,18 whereupon the President might then issue a new
recess commission to fill the vacancy left by the expiration of the pre-
vious commission. If, during the Senate's session the President
submitted his nomination and it was rejected, by the terms of the recess
clause the rejection would not terminate the commission already issued.
The issued commission expires only at the end of the Senate's session.
Nevertheless, the court was unwilling to discard a useful tool on the
mere supposition that it might be misused. It should be noted, how-
ever, that there has been, at least in the eyes of Congress, some abuse
of this power. President Lincoln, during the Civil War, bypassed the
"normal" appointment procedure in issuing commissions to govern-
ment officials, thus prompting Congress to pass some restrictive legis-
lation denying payment to appointees serving without Senate ap-
proval. 2" This statute, however, has been recently amended.2 ' The
court was aware of this incident, and one is left with the feeling that it
was accorded its proper weight. Such isolated occurrences during
deeply troubled times probably have little value in predicting future
events.
Since the net effect of this decision is to give judicial sanction to a
broad use of the recess appointment power, probably the greatest
objection to the holding will come from those who view as unconstitu-
tional the use of the recess power with respect to judges granted life
tenure by the Constitution.
17 Id. at 712.
18 See note 5 supra.
19 See In re Marshalship, 20 Fed. 379 (D.C. Ala. 1884).
20 5 U.S.C. § 56 (1958) ; for a summary of the legislative history of the statute.
and the events leading to its enactment, see STAFF HOUSE CoMMaf. ON THE JUDICIARY,
86TH CONG., 1ST SEss., RECESS A'POINTMENT OF FEDERAL JUDGES (Comm. Print 1959).
21 See note 20, supra.
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Although the practice of making recess appointments. to the federal
bench without regard to when the vacancy first occurred has long-been
established, this is the first time that it has received federal judicial
approval. Furthermore, this is the first federal decision in recent times
dealing directly with the general recess appointment power. Indeed, it
may be said that there is scant authority on the point, and what author-
ity exists may be termed conflicting.
The court cited as authority an old federal case, "and noted the
existence of a contrary unreported federal case.2 However,* there tare
other reported cases contrary to the case cited by the court!3 Further-
more, there is a strong dictum in a Supreme Court opinion- that teids
to refute the position taken by the court in the principal case.2"
However, it should be noted that none of the cases referred to, other
than the principal case, deals with appointments to the judiciary.
The court does not appear troubled by the fact that nearly all
authority dealing with the general recess appointive power, and the
power as exercised in the instant case, are concerned with appointments
to executive offices. The court states: "[W] e perceive nothing in the
Constitution which indicates that judicial appointments are to be
treated differently from any other appointments.... . 5 This overlooks
the major distinction between judicial and executive officers, namely,
that certain of the former are to have life tenure, thus ensuring their
independence. In light of this real distinction between judicial and
executive officers, perhaps the court should have given greater con-
sideration to the consequences of exempting those offices normally
carrying life tenure from the exercise of the recess power.
In light of the various mechanisms available for alleviating the
effects of temporary vacancies in the judiciary, such as using retired
judges and transferring judges from one district to another,- one may
well question the need for giving sanction to the expanded use of the
recess power, an expansion which removes the major protection con-
ferred on the judge by the constitution. Furthermore, if the court were
primarily concerned with the effect which temporary vacancies in the
22 United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 714 (2d cir. 1962).
23 Schenck v. Peay, 21 Fed. Cas. 672 (No. 12451) (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1869); ln re
District Attorney of the United States, 7 Fed. Cas. 731 (No. 3924) (D.C.E.D. Pa.
1868).24 United States v. Corson, 114 U.S. 619, 620 (1895).
25 United States v. Allocco, 305 F2d 704, 710 (2d cir. 1962).
2628 U.S.C. 291 (1958) provides for temporary assignment of district or circuit
judges to other districts. 28 U.S.C. 294 (1958) provides for temporary usage of
retired judges... . . .! "
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judiciary would have on the workload of the individual judge and,
consequently, on the speed, efficiency, and quality of the administration
of justice, then does not the best solution to the problem lie with
Congress, which can create sufficient judgeships to alleviate the burdens
of untimely vacancies? Such a solution would not require judges to
hear cases while knowing that their decisions might cause the Senate
to withhold approval of their nominations. Nor could the Senate
committee passing on the nomination of a recess appointee question
him about cases then pending before him or already decided by him.27
Since the court based its decision primarily on considerations of
policy, a fuller delineation of these considerations would have been
helpful.
THEODORE RO0DNER
27 Note, 10 STAN. L. REv. 124 (1957).
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